Generated Title: Driscoll's Data-Driven Army: A Silicon Valley Hail Mary?
Alright, let's dissect what Army Secretary Dan Driscoll is selling. The pitch? The U.S. Army is pivoting away from traditional defense contractors—the "primes," as he calls them—and cozying up to Silicon Valley startups. The reason, according to Driscoll, is that the primes "conned the American people and the Pentagon" into believing that bespoke military solutions were always necessary. Now, he wants 90% of acquisitions to be commercially available tech.
It's a bold claim, but does the data back it up?
The Acquisition Revamp: A Numbers Game
The Army's acquisition structure is getting a facelift. They're consolidating from 12 Program Executive Offices (PEOs) down to six Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs). The stated goal is a 30-50% acceleration in the acquisition process. (That’s the claim, anyway.) Army Overhauls Acquisition Structure
The new structure places these PAEs under Army Transformation and Training Command and the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, or ASA(ALT).
Here's the breakdown of the PAEs:
* PAE Fires
* PAE Command and Control and Counter C2
* PAE Maneuver Ground
* PAE Maneuver Air
* PAE Agile Sustainment and Ammunition
* PAE Layered Protection Plus Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear, or CBRN
Each PAE will be led by a two-star general or civilian equivalent.
Driscoll claims this will cut bureaucracy and paperwork. Okay, but let's be real: government reorganizations are notorious for adding layers of complexity, at least initially. What metrics are they using to track this 30-50% speed increase? Is it the time from initial concept to contract award? Or from contract award to actual deployment? The devil, as always, is in the details, and those details are suspiciously absent.
The Army is also establishing the Pathway for Innovation and Technology, or PIT, office to quickly develop new technologies and scale successful ones across the service. PIT will oversee portions of RCCTO, the Army Applications Laboratory and the Joint Innovation Outpost. It will also host non-traditional programs and support companies seeking to enter the defense industrial base.
Commercial vs. Bespoke: The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Driscoll argues that commercial solutions are "equal to or better" than military-specific ones, and crucially, they can be scaled faster in a large-scale conflict. He cites General Motors engines in infantry squad vehicles and Caterpillar engines for the next-gen Abrams tank as examples.
That sounds good on paper. But what's the actual cost difference? Are we talking a 5% reduction in procurement costs, or a 50% reduction? And what are the trade-offs in terms of durability, security, and specialized performance? A commercially available engine might be cheaper upfront, but what if it requires twice as much maintenance in a combat environment? Those long-term costs can quickly erode any initial savings.
And this is the part of the report that I find genuinely puzzling: Driscoll acknowledges that the Army itself is partly to blame for the primes' behavior. He admits the Army has been a "bad customer" and has incentivized inefficiency over the years. So, is the problem really the defense contractors, or is it the Army's own bureaucratic processes? Slapping a Silicon Valley label on the problem doesn't magically solve it.
Driscoll's claim that the primes "conned" the American people is also a bit rich. The defense industry ‘conned the American people and the Pentagon’: Army Secretary Defense contractors are, after all, businesses. Their job is to maximize profits within the existing system. If the Army is now changing the rules of the game, that's fine, but let's not pretend the primes were operating in a vacuum.
The Cyber Threat: A Blind Spot?
One area where commercial solutions might not be adequate is cybersecurity. Representative Don Bacon pointed out that Chinese state-sponsored hackers are already using AI to automate cyber espionage. Bacon also notes the US has had no commander in charge of Cyber Command for over eight months, the top two positions at the National Security Agency, the top two are vacant for over eight months, and the CISA has been cut by about a third.
Are commercially available cybersecurity tools robust enough to defend against nation-state actors? Or do we need highly specialized, military-grade solutions? This is a critical question that Driscoll seems to gloss over.
The Bottom Line: A Risky Bet?
Driscoll's vision of a data-driven, Silicon Valley-infused Army is certainly appealing. The idea of faster, cheaper, and more scalable acquisitions is something everyone can get behind. But the data—or rather, the lack of detailed data—makes me skeptical.
Without clear metrics, rigorous cost-benefit analyses, and a frank assessment of the risks, this "revolution" could end up being just another expensive experiment. And the troops will be the ones paying the price.